

October 2016

Two years of good MANRS  
<https://www.manrs.org/>



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# What problem are we trying to address?

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is based on trust

- No build-in validation of the legitimacy of updates
- Chain of “trust” spans continents
- Lack of reliable resource data



# Do we have enough tools?

Probably yes

- Prefix and AS-PATH filtering, RPKI, IRR, ...
- BGPSEC under development at the IETF
- Whois, Routing Registries and Peering databases

# Are they effectively deployed?

Probably not

- BGPStream



Event type	Country	ASN	Start time	End time	info
BGP Leak		Origin AS: AS number for New World Telephone Ltd. (AS 17444) Leaker AS: Suite 2101~02, 21/F, Tower 2, Nina Tower (AS 45474)	2016-11-16 15:39:21		<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		Assoc do Inst Nac de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (AS 262829)	2016-11-16 15:32:00	2016-11-16 15:35:00	<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		ETAPA EP (AS 27668)	2016-11-16 15:28:00	2016-11-16 15:32:00	<a href="#">More detail</a>
BGP Leak		Origin AS: TECHSPACE INC. (AS 20277) Leaker AS: ViaWest (AS 13649)	2016-11-16 15:19:57		<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		ETAPA EP (AS 27668)	2016-11-16 15:10:00	2016-11-16 15:14:00	<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		MGNET INFORMATICA E SERVIÇOS LTDA (AS 262569)	2016-11-16 15:05:00		<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		Global Conect Ltda (AS 262735)	2016-11-16 14:52:00		<a href="#">More detail</a>
BGP Leak		Origin AS: iPi9 (AS 37390) Leaker AS: OPENTRANSIT (AS 5511)	2016-11-16 14:35:59		<a href="#">More detail</a>
Outage		POWERSAT SERVICOS DE TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA (AS 262337)	2016-11-16 14:13:00	2016-11-16 14:17:00	<a href="#">More detail</a>

# It is a socio-economic problem

From the routing perspective securing one's own network does not make it more secure. The network security is in someone else's hands

- The more hands – the better the security

Is there a clear, visible and industry supported line between good and bad?

- A cultural norm

A clearly articulated baseline –  
a minimum requirement (MCOP)

+

Visible support with commitment

# Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)

MANRS defines four concrete actions that network operators should implement

- Technology-neutral baseline for global adoption

MANRS builds a visible community of security-minded operators

- Promotes culture of collaborative responsibility



MANRS

# Comcast Example

- Before MANRS, Comcast implemented these actions within their 33 networks covering 20 million customers in North America.
- But they realized their actions *alone* would not be sufficient.
- Recognized need to join with others and to promote this type of conduct by all network operators.




Comcast is committed to helping drive improvements to the reliability of the Internet ecosystem. **We are thrilled to be engaged with other infrastructure participants** across the spectrum and around the globe in pursuit of these goals.

- Jason Livingood, Vice President,  
Internet Services, Comcast


# Good MANRS

1. Filtering – Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information.
2. Anti-spoofing – Prevent traffic with spoofed source IP addresses.
3. Coordination – Facilitate global operational communication and coordination between network operators.
4. Global Validation – Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale.





# MANRS use case: the network and topology



# MANRS is not (only) a document – it is a commitment

- 1) The member supports the Principles and implements at least one of the Actions for the majority of its infrastructure.
- 2) The member becomes a Participant of MANRS, helping to maintain and improve the document and to promote MANRS objectives

MANRS is not a firewall that will protect your network.

MANRS is a commitment – and a community.

MANRS is a mark of quality.












































Good network routing practice is the **fundamental requirement for trust** between providers, and ultimately creates a safer and stronger Internet for customers.

*Jaya Baloo, Chief Information Security Officer, KPN*


# Public launch of the initiative - 6 November 2014



# A growing list of participants

	Country	ASNs	Filtering	Anti-spoofing	Coordination	Global Validation
KPN	NL	1136, 5615, 8737				
Seeweb	IT	12637				
Gigas	ES, US	57286, 27640				
NTT	US	2914				
BIT BV	NL	12859				
Algar Telecom	BR	16735, 53006, 27664				
OpenCarrier eG	DE	41692				
SpaceNet	DE	5539				
CERNET	CN	4538				
SpeedPartner GmbH	DE	34225				
Comcast	US	7015, 7016, 7725, 7922, 11025, 13367				

# Two years of MANRS



You may say we're dreamers...



How to bridge this gap?



# Increasing gravity by making MANRS a platform for related activities

## Developing better guidance

- MANRS Best Current Operational Practices (BCOP) document: <http://tinyurl.com/MANRS-BCOP>

## Potential training/certification programme

- Based on BCOP document and an online module

## Bringing new types of members on board

- IXPs, vendors

## Developing a better “business case” for MANRS

- MANRS value proposition for your customers

## Creating a trusted community

- A group with a similar attitude towards security

# MANRS training and certification

## Routing security is hard

- The MANRS BCOP was envisaged as a simple instruction set
- Instead we have a 50-page document that assumes certain level of expertise
- How can we make it more accessible?

## A set of online training modules

- Based on the MANRS BCOP
- Walks a student through the tutorial with a test at the end
- Working with and looking for partners that are interested in integrating it in their curricula

## A hands-on lab to achieve MANRS certification

- Completing an online module as a first step in MANRS certification
- Looking for partners

# MANRS IXP Partnership Programme

There is synergy between MANRS and IXPs in this area

- IXPs form a community with a common operational objective
- MANRS is a reference point with a global presence – useful for building a “safe neighborhood”

How IXPs can contribute?

- Technical measures: Route Server with validation, alerting on unwanted traffic, providing debugging and monitoring tools
- Social measures: MANRS ambassador role, local audit as part of the on-boarding process

One membership or a separate category?

- The existing set may not be directly applicable
- A development team is working on a set of useful actions

# How to sign up

Go to <http://www.routingmanifesto.org/signup/>

- Provide requested information
- Please provide as much detail on how Actions are implemented as possible

We may ask questions and ask you to run a few tests

- Routing “background check”
- Spoofer <https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/>

Your answer to “Why did you decide to join?” may be displayed in the testimonials

Download the logo and use it

Become an active MANRS participant





Join us to make routing more secure

<https://www.manrs.org/>

Visit us at  
[www.internetsociety.org](http://www.internetsociety.org)  
Follow us  
[@internetsociety](https://twitter.com/internetsociety)

*Adherence to MANRS is an important commitment that operators make back to the Internet community. Together we aim to remove the havens from which miscreants maintain the freedom and anonymity to attack our network and our customers.* David Freedman, Claranet Group

*Comcast is committed to helping drive improvements to the reliability of the Internet ecosystem. We are thrilled to be engaged with other infrastructure participants across the spectrum and around the globe in pursuit of these goals.* Jason Livingood, Vice President, Internet Services, Comcast

*We believe the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet operation can be improved via distributed and shared responsibilities as documented in MANRS. As one of the largest academic networks in the world, CERNET is committed to the MANRS actions.* Xing Li, Deputy Director, CERNET

*We believe that the objectives and scope match our beliefs and our behaviour, and that by signing up, we may help encourage others to do so.* Ian Dickinson, Network Architect, Sky

*Zayo is interested and desires to be more active in promoting global routing security; the MANRS document is in our (and my) opinion a really good initial level of recommendations. I think that the more participation in MANRS, the safer our routing ecosystem. And a safer routing system is good for all of us!* Robert Hagens, VP, IP Architecture, Zayo

*Workonline implements the recommendations contained in the MANRS document by default. By publicly stating the measures that we take to ensure the robustness of our network, we hope to encourage our customers and peers to do the same.* Ben Maddison, Director - Network Operations & Strategy